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Unfair Labor Practices, Individual Rights and
Section 301
Irving Kovarsky*
The writer here examines recent unfair labor practice decisions of
the Supreme Court, focusing on the case of Smith v. Evening News
Association. Mr. Kovarsky concludes that the holding in the Smith case
may threaten desired uniformity in the administration of legislation in
this area.
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 10, 1962, the United States Supreme Court, in Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n,1 established several principles of law which
may rival the well-known decision of Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills2 in importance. The purpose of this comment is to
examine the far-reaching implications of Evening News and related
Supreme Court decisions.
The public need for a uniform labor policy to control firms and
unions operating in interstate commerce has received considerable
attention from the Court.3 Because of this need for uniformity, the
impact of state law on labor relations has been minimized. While
conceding the desirability of uniform regulation, the majority opinion
in Evening News has maximized the possibility of conflict, since state
courts, federal courts, the NLRB, and, apparently, arbitrators are
authorized to decide the same question under different provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Act. The NLRB will continue to take action
under section 8 when unfair labor practice charges are preferred, and
section 301 permits state courts, federal courts, and arbitrators to hear
the same controversy.
*Department of Management, Southern Illinois University. The author wishes to
express appreciation toYhflip-Legendre,-giidu~fe student at Southern Illinois Univers-
ity, for his help in preparing this article.
1. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
2. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3. In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
245 (1959); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 399 (1951).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
II. SMrI v. EvENNc NEWS ASS'N IN THE MicmAN CoUTrs
The plaintiff, a building maintenance employee and assignee of the
claims of forty-nine other employees, sued his employer in the Wayne
County Circuit Court in Michigan for failing to abide by a collective
bargaining agreement negotiated with the Newspaper Guild of
Detroit.4 The agreement provided that "'There shall be no discrimina-
tion against any employee because of his membership or activity in
the Guild."' 5 Members of another union struck the employer, and
nonunion, white-collar personnel were fully compensated even though
unable to work.6 Many members of the Newspaper Guild, including
the plaintiff, requested work during the strike but were refused by
the employer.
The plaintiff, because of the six-month statute of limitations con-
trolling unfair labor practice charges, was not entitled to NLRB
adjudication and was forced to seek a remedy through the courts
for the alleged contract violation.7 Why a state court was pre-
ferred to a federal court is not indicated. Suing for loss of pay,
the plaintiff contended that the employer had violated the agreement
by discriminating, contrary to contract, against union employees. The
employer claimed that the discrimination constituted an unfair labor
practice, regulated exclusively by the NLRB. Agreeing with the
employer's defense that a state court is legally prevented from ad-
judicating a breach of contract suit if it concerns an unfair labor
practice, the trial court dismissed the case.
On appeal the plaintiff, claiming that Congress had not intended
the doctrine of pre-emption to apply to all labor law problems," cited
as authority United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction
Corp.9 and UAW v. Russell.10 In these cases, the Supreme Court had
ruled that a state court may properly award damages for union
violence even though an unfair labor practice had been com-
mitted. The Court permitted recovery because persons injured by a
tort traditionally are entitled to seek relief in a state court; further-
more, federal regulation of labor-management affairs would not be
hampered by allowing such actions. Foreseeing a threat to the uni-
form regulation of labor-management relations, Justice Douglas dis-
sented in both cases."
4. 371 U.S. at 195-96.
5. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 362 Mich. 350, 351, 106 N.W.2d 785, 786 (1961).
6. Ibid.
7. 371 U.S. at 197 n.5.
8. 362 Mich. at 353-54, 106 N.W.2d at 786-87.
9. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
10. 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
11. 356 U.S. at 647; 347 U.S. at 669. In Russell, Justice Douglas joined in Chief
Justice Warren's dissenting opinion.
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Acknowledging difficulty in determining whether Congress exer-
cised its power of pre-emption and "vested exclusive jurisdiction in
the National Labor Relations Board,"'2 the Michigan Supreme Court,
relying on and quoting from San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Gar non, 3 ruled that "'When an activity is arguably subject to
section 7 or section 8 of the [Taft-Hartley] act, the States as well as
the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
National Labor Relations Board if the danger of State interference
with national policy is to be averted."'14 In Garmon, the defendant
union peacefully picketed the employer, thereby violating the tort
provisions of the California Civil Code. Justice Frankfurter, deciding
that the federal interest in controlling unfair labor practices was not
a "peripheral concern,"15 held that state and federal courts are not
free to regulate conduct "arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 . ... 16
Justice Frankfurter limited state court jurisdiction to "violence and
imminent threats to the public order."' 7 The Michigan Supreme Court
quoted from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Garmon,18 which
also relied on Laburnum and Russell.19 Justice Harlan in Garmon
said:
In determining pre-emption in any given labor case, I would adhere to
the Laburnum and Russell distinction between damages and injunctions and
to the principle that state power is not precluded where the challenged
conduct is neither protected nor prohibited under the federal Act. Solely
because it is fairly debatable whether the conduct here involved is federally
protected, I concur in the result of today's decision.
2o
He did not agree with Justice Frankfurter and would not limit state
jurisdiction to periods of violence. Rather, he asserted that if the
activity is federally protected, state courts cannot regulate it. In
Russell and Laburnum, Justice Harlan decided that the violence was
not federally protected so that it "could then only have been classified
as prohibited or 'neither protected nor prohibited."'21 In Garmon,
he indicated that he would permit, in a state court, a tort suit, though
the activity also constituted an unfair labor practice, if such activity
is neither federally protected nor prohibited. He expressed concern
12. 362 Mich. at 355, 106 N.W.2d at 787.
13. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
14. 362 Mich. at 358, 106 N.W.2d at 789.
15. 359 U.S. at 243.
16. Id. at 245.
17. Id. at 247.
18. In fact, most of the opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court is a quotation from
Garmon.
19. 362 Mich. at 360-64, 106 N.W.2d at 790-93.
20. 359 U.S. at 254. (Emphasis added.)
21. Id. at 251.
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because the majority opinion in Garmon would cut "deeply into the
ability of States to furnish an effective remedy under their own laws
for the redress of past nonviolent tortious conduct . ..."2
The Michigan Supreme Court in Evening News concluded:
Plaintiff may not characterize an act which constitutes an unfair labor
practice as a contract violation and thereby circumvent the plain mandate
of Congress-that jurisdiction of such matters be vested in the National
Labor Relations Board and that Federal and State trial courts are without
jurisdiction to redress by injunction or otherwise unfair labor practices. If
the rule were otherwise, then Federal and State courts could assume juris-
diction over all types of unfair labor practices under the guise of enforcing
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, provided the agreement
contains terms governing such matters, and thereby circumvent the plain
mandate of Congress.2
The United States Supreme Court in Garmon expressed a desire to
limit the jurisdiction of state courts. Justice Frankfurter stated:
When the exercise of state power over a particular area of activity
threatened interference with the clearly indicated policy of industrial rela-
tions, it has been judicially necessary to preclude the States from acting ...
[unless] the activity regulated was merely a peripheral concern of the
Labor Management Relations Act . . . . Or where the regulated conduct
touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that,
in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that
Congress had deprived the States of the power to act. 24
Acknowledging a possible unfair labor practice violation, Justice
Frankfurter felt that state and federal courts "must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the
danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted."23
Justice Frankfurter would deny damages under state law even where
the NLRB declines to assert jurisdiction; the awards in Laburnum
and Russell were upheld only because of "compelling state interest
... in the maintenance of domestic peace...."2
It seems that the Michigan Supreme Court in Evening News was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court merely because of a
change in personnel.
III. Lucas FLOrtr, DowD Box, AiNm AriusoN
In deciding Smith v. Evening News Assn, 7 Justice White relied
22. Id. at 253.
23. 362 Mich. at 364-65, 106 N.W.2d at 793. (Emphasis added.)
24. 359 U.S. at 243-44. (Footnotes omitted.)
25. Id. at 245.
26. Id. at 247.
27. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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on Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.," Charles Dowd
Box Co. v. Courtney,29 and Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., deci-
sions made by the United States Supreme Court after the Michigan
Supreme Court published its opinion. These pertinent. decisions, as
well as others, will now be reviewed.
In Dowd Box, the Supreme Court limited its opinion to a considera-
tion of whether the Taft-Hartley Act divests "a state court of jurisdic-
tion over a suit for violation of a contract between an employer and a
labor organization."31 After settling a number of contractual problems,
a "Stipulation" was signed by union and employer representatives.
The employer publicized the "Stipulation" to employees, but later
changed his mind and reverted to the terms of the expired agreement
because "its bargaining representatives had acted without authority in
negotiating the new agreement, and.., the union had been so advised
before any contract had actually been concluded."32 As a result, the
union, in a Massachusetts court, sought to establish "a valid and
binding collective bargaining agreement. . . ."3 Claiming federal
pre-emption via section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, the employer
questioned the jurisdiction of the state court. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, favoring concurrent jurisdiction, decided that
neither section 301 nor Lincoln Mills vested exclusive jurisdiction in
federal courts over contract actions and that "In the absence of a clear
holding by the Supreme Court of the United States that Federal
jurisdiction has been made exclusive, we shall not make what would
be tantamount to an abdication of the hitherto undoubted jurisdiction
of our own courts.... ."
Agreeing with the Massachusetts court, the United States Supreme
Court could not find in section 301 a grant of exclusive jurisdiction
to federal courts.- According to Justice Stewart, who wrote the
opinion in Dowd Box, Lincoln Mills was a mandate to federal
courts to hear claims arising under section 301.m He said:
Such a construction [exclusive federal jurisdiction] of § 301(a) would also
disregard the particularized history behind the enactment of that provision
of the federal labor law. The legislative history makes clear that the basic
purpose of § 301 (a) was not to limit, but to expand, the availability of
forums for the enforcement of contracts made by labor organizations.
28. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
29. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
30. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
31. 368 U.S. at 503.
32. Id. at 504.
33. Ibid.
34. Courtney v. Charles Dowd Box Co., 341 Mass. 337, 339, 169 N.E.2d 885, 887
(1960).
35. 368 U.S. at 506.
36. Id. at 507.
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Moreover, there is explicit evidence that Congress expressly intended not
to encroach upon the existing jurisdiction of the state courts.37
Recognizing a possible violation of the employer's obligation to bar-
gain in good faith, Justice Stewart referred to section 8(a) (6).8
Apparently, the employer violated section 8(a)(5) by refusing to
abide by the terms of the "Stipulation," by failing to complete the
preliminary agreement,m and by not appointing management repre-
sentatives with authority to negotiate a binding agreement. 4°
Justice Stewart in Dowd Box acknowledged the applicability of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to a contract action controlled by federal law
but brought in a state court had not been answered by the Supreme
Court.41 Furthermore, "whether there might be impediments to the
free removal to a federal court of such a suit" was not considered.
42
The union in court sought recognition of the temporary agreement,
damages, an accounting, and "an order enjoining the company from
terminating or violating [the "Stipulation"] . . . ."43 The trial court
"declared the agreement to be valid, and ordered the payment of
specific amounts to members of the class for whom the suit was
brought."44 Since an injunction is not mentioned, presumably one
was not issued. Furthermore, the Court did not toy with the problem
of an arbitrator making awards in controversies which are also unfair
labor practices. Although the Supreme Court has "blessed" arbitra-
tion,45 the question whether an arbitrator may properly make an
award if an unfair labor practice occurs remains unanswered.46
Since it concerned both an unfair labor practice and a contract,
Dowd Box was considered by Justice White in Evening News to be
37. Id. at 508-09. (Emphasis added.) Is the legislative history really "clear"?
38. Id. at 510-11.
39. H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
40. Great Southern Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1942).
41. 368 U.S. at 514 & n.8.
42. Id. at 514 n.8.
43. Id. at 504.
44. 341 Mass. at 338, 169 N.E.2d at 886.
45. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 n.2 (1957). The three 1960 Steelworker cases protecting
the arbitration process still leave open the question whether the arbitrator is authorized
to make a decision under the collective bargaining agreement.
46. In Mastro Plastic Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 282-83 (1956), the United
States Supreme Court did indicate that the "strike and lockout clauses (and the
claim of an unfair labor practice) are natural adjuncts of an operating policy aimed
at avoiding interruptions of production prompted by efforts to change existing economic
relationships. The main function of arbitration under the contract is to provide a
mechanism for avoiding similar stoppages due to disputes over the meaning and
application of the various contractual provisions." See also Dunau, Contractual Pro-
hibition Of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional Problems, 57 CoLUmf. L. REv. 52
(1957); Note, 69 HAnv. L. RPv. 725 (1955).
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authority for the proposition that courts can deal with contractual
violations which are unfair labor practices 47 Since he did not disagree
with Justice White in Evening News, Justice Stewart, like Justice
Harlan in Garmon,4 did not consider this a disadvantage and will-
ingly accepted concurrent NLRB and court jurisdiction.
In Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,49 an employee
was discharged for inefficiency. Protesting the discharge, the union
struck the employer for eight days. The discharge was later arbi-
trated, and the Board of Arbitration favored the employer. Mean-
while, the employer brought suit in a Washington court to recover
damages inflicted by the strike. The Washington court, applying state
contract law, awarded damages to the employer.50 The court doubted
that the strike constituted an unfair labor practice violation. In Black
v. Cutter Laboratories,51 the United States Supreme Court had per-
mitted state contract law to prevail over federal law when an em-
ployee was discharged for either his Communist sympathies or the
employer's antiunion bias. Black, decided before Lincoln Mills, thus
appears to stand for the proposition that state contract law governs
even though an unfair labor practice is involved. On the other hand,
Lincoln Mills indicates that federal contract law must be fashioned
and applied. The Court in Dowd Box did not consider this question.
Justice Stewart, writing the majority opinion for the Supreme Court
in Lucas Flour, without mentioning Black, followed the rationale
expressed in Lincoln Mills and said that "there was no claim of any
variance in relevant legal principles as between the federal law and
that of Massachusetts," 52 but that "incompatible doctrines of local law
must give way to principles of federal labor law"53 and state courts
are required to follow federal law in a section 301 proceeding. Justice
Stewart favored federal law and uniform regulation in order to
minimize "disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and ad-
ministration of collective agreements. "54 Although the collective
agreement did not contain a no-strike clause, Justice Stewart, in order
to invoke section 301, implied a union promise not to strike. Justice
Stewart plunged the needle of federalism deeper, preferring federal
regulation over agreements to arbitrate. He concluded:
47. 371 U.S. at 197.
48. 359 U.S. at 250-51.
49. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
50. Lucas Flour Co. v. Teamsters Union, 57 Wash. 95, 356 P.2d 1 (1960).
51. 351 U.S. 292 (1956). In fact, the arbitrator had ruled in this case .that the
discharge of the employee was based on an antiunion motive, an unfair practice
violation. See 15 Lab. Arb. 431 (1950).
52. 369 U.S. at 102.
53. Ibid. (Footnote omitted.)
54. Id. at 103.
1963]
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What has been said is not to suggest that a no-strike agreement is to be
implied beyond the area which it has been agreed will be exclusively
covered by compulsory terminal arbitration. Nor is it to suggest that there
may not arise problems in specific cases as to whether compulsory and
binding arbitration has been agreed upon, and, if so, as to what disputes
have been made arbitrable. But no such problems are present in this case.
The grievance over which the union struck was, as it concedes, one which
it had expressly agreed to settle by submission to final and binding arbitra-
tion proceedings. The strike which it called was a violation of that con-
tractual obligation.
55
Justice Black, who had concurred in Dowd Box, dissented in Lucas
Flour because the union had not contractually relinquished its right
to strike-i.e., to imply an agreement not to strike was in poor legal
taste.6 Justice Black did not question the applicability of federal law
in a state court.
Although the Taft-Hartley Act seemingly promotes voluntary arbi-
tration, the decision by Justice Stewart is another step in the direction
of compulsory arbitration. By implying an agreement not to strike
where arbitration is provided for, unions must rely on the arbitrator
for the settlement of disputes rather than the use of economic
pressure. Justice Black recognized this in his dissent.51
The majority opinion in Lucas Flour creates as many problems as
it purports to solve. Can a state court adjudicate a controversy when
the federal law is not yet established? Does Lincoln Mills require
federal judges to establish the controlling substantive law or are state
courts permitted to decide federal policy? What if the established
federal law affects indirectly the problem presented to a state court-
can a state court hear the squabble? When will a no-strike agreement
be implied?
In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,58 the Court considered the
Norris-LaGuardia Act59 containment of labor injunctions together with
section 301. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was ushered in at a time
when unions were weak and many federal judges irresponsibly
granted injunctions.60 When Taft-Hartley was enacted in 1947, unions
were powerful and federal judges used the injunction sparingly. Con-
gress, however, failed to indicate in section 301 if the injunction
sought by an employer was again legally stylish. The Norris-La-
Guardia Act was specifically amended as to those situations in which
55. Id. at 106. (Footnote omitted.)
56. Id. at 106-10.
57. Id. at 110.
58. 370 U.S. 195 (1962). See 16 VAND. L. REv. 245 (1962).
59. 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).




the NLRB requests an injunction and as to other situations.61 The
question awaiting answer in Atkinson was whether section 301 im-
pliedly amended section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
62
In Atkinson, the employer agreed to arbitrate disputes "'regarding
wages, hours or working conditions... ."; the union in turn faith-
fully promised not to strike for "'any cause which is or may be the
subject of a grievance. . . ."6 Violating the agreement, the union
struck nine times during a nineteen month period. The employer,
claiming irreparable injury, sought an injunction in a federal court to
prevent the strikes. The union, latching onto the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, claimed that an injunction is improperly issued in a "labor dis-
pute." Agreeing with the district court" and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals,65 the Supreme Court ruled that section 13 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act forbade labor injunctions while section 2 pro-
tected the right to strike.
Justice Black, writing the majority opinion in Atkinson, concluded
that Taft-Hartley failed to clip the reach of section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act since section 301 did not specifically amend it and
the NLRB was expressly authorized to seek injunctions in other
specific situations. According to Justice Black, this signalled a con-
gressional desire to withhold injunctions sought by private persons.
66
With respect to the legal impact of Atkinson on Evening News, the
employer in the former claimed violations of the agreement to arbi-
trate and not a series of unfair labor practices. It is doubtful whether
the strikes could have been validly classified as unfair labor prac-
tices.67 Apparently, the employer's only remedy in Atkinson was to
invoke section 301 and seek damages and/or an injunction. Yet
Justice White in Evening News cited Atkinson as authority for con-
current NLRB and court jurisdiction.
Prior to Lincoln Mills there was little to indicate that section 301
authorized the labor injunction in federal courts. In Lincoln Mills,
Justice Douglas decided that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not pro-
61. 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160 (h), (j) (1958); 61 Stat. 149 (1947)
(amended by 73 Stat. 544 (1959), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1) (Supp. III,
1962)); 61 Stat. 155 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 178 (1958); 73 Stat. 537 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 186 (Supp. III, 1962).
62. In A.H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957),
the Supreme Court denied certiorari when a temporary injunction was requested. 355
U.S. 932 (1958).
63. 370 U.S. at 197.
64. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 187 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1960).
65. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961).
66. 370 U.S. at 207-10.
67. The district judge said: "There is nothing in the record at this point to indicate
that the events claimed to constitute a violation of the contract also involved either
protected or prohibited activity. But even the presence of such activities would not




hibit an injunction to force an employer to abide by an agreement to
arbitrate.6 The formidable front of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
broken on a large scale.
69
Lincoln Mills was later implemented by United Steelworkers v.
American Manufacturing Co.,70 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co.,'1 and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp.,.72 Supreme Court decisions which approved court orders forcing
employers to arbitrate or to abide by an award. Had an order been
sought in Atkinson to force arbitration, the decisions cited would
support an employer's request for injunctive help. Justice Black in
Atkinson said that the restraining orders approved in Lincoln Mills,
American Manufacturing Co., Warrior, and Enterprise did not hamper
the type of activity freed from injunction by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Rather, the injunctions implemented the arbitration process
favored by Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act. In fact, in Lincoln Mills,
American Manufacturing Co., Warrior, and Enterprise, injunctions
were aimed at employers rather than unions. In Atkinson, Justice
Black denied relief because "an injunction against work stoppages,
peaceful picketing or the nonfraudulent encouraging of those activ-
ities . . . ." would frustrate congressional intent expressed in section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.73 Evidently, he felt that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act protects unions engaging in peaceful economic coer-
cion from injunction, and that a collective bargaining contract does
not change congressional intent. His opinion means that injunctions
cannot be issued against unions in a federal court, except for violence
or fraud, while the employer is not similarly favored.
By ignoring the problem of statutory accommodation, Justice Black
chose to disregard an important factor. Employers agreeing to arbi-
trate disputes recognize the inevitability of industrial conflict and the
need to provide a forum to adjust differences. It is unfair to restrict
the employer to a suit for damages if it is an inadequate remedy. In
Atkinson, the NLRB could not hold the union responsible for violating
section 8(b). Therefore, not even the NLRB could request an injunc-
tion to stop the strikes. The decision by Justice Black fails to promote
collective bargaining. If a union cannot be forced to abide by a
contract, employers will seek to circumvent good faith bargaining or
possibly look for help in a state court.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Atkinson, felt that Lincoln Mills,
68. 353 U.S. at 457-59.
.69. Actually, the anti-injunction provisions had been disregarded in other cases. See
Allen Bradley Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) and
Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
70. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
71. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
72. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
73. 370 U.S. at 212.
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American Manufacturing Co., Warrior, and Enterprise authorized the
use of the injunction." Finding nothing in section 301 to limit the
choice of remedies, he advocated an accommodation of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to section 301.75 He believed that Lincoln Mills
opened Pandora's box and determined that, in the interest of equality,
injunctions should be issued against unions ignoring a collective
bargaining contract. As indicated, Justice Black accepted the failure
to amend the Norris-LaGuardia Act as evidence that Congress wished
to maintain the status quo26 Justice Brennan on the other hand
reasoned as follows:
Sound reasons explain why repeal of Non'is-LaGuardia provisions, accept-
able in other settings, might have been found ill-suited for the purpose of
§ 301. And those reasons fall far short of a design to preclude absolutely
the issuance under § 301 of any injunction against an activity included in
§4 ... 77
[Although Congress specifically modified the effect of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act in sections 10(h), 208(b), and 302(e) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, the problems created under section 301 are different.] The Congress
understandably may not have felt able to predict what provisions would
crop up in collective bargaining agreements . . . . The consequences of
repealing the anti-injunction provisions in this context would have been
completely unknowable, and outright repeal, therefore, might well have
seemed unthinkable. Congress, clearly, had no intention of abandoning
wholesale the Norris-LaGuardia policies in contract suits; but it does not
follow that § 301 is not the equal of § 4 in cases which implicate both
provisions.7 8
It follows that to construe the Conference Committee's elimination of the
House repeal as leaving open the possibility of judicial accommodation is
at least as reasonable as to conclude that Congress, by its silence, was
directing the courts to disregard § 301 whenever opposition from § 4 was
encountered. 79
justice Brennan did not urge complete abandonment of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in section 301 disputes if "breaches of private con-
tracts do not threaten any additional public policy," such as where a
"binding agreement to arbitrate" is not agreed to. However, "insist-
ence upon strict application of Norris-LaGuardia to a strike over a
dispute which both parties are bound by contract to arbitrate
threatens a leading policy of our labor relations law . "... 80
74. Id. at 216 & n.1.
75. Id. at 218-19.
76. Id. at 204.
77. Id. at 221. Justice Black was equally certain of his position. He states, "If
Congress had intended that § 301 suits should also not be subject to the anti-injunction
provisions ... it certainly seems likely that it would have made its intent known ....
Td. at 204. (Emphasis added.)
78. Id. at 222-23. (Emphasis added.)
79. Id. at 224. (Footnotes omitted.)
80. Id at 225.
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In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana
R.R.,8' the Supreme Court, relying on congressional intent, had
decided that an injunction was proper to force unions to submit
disputes to the Railroad Adjustment Board, irrespective of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. Justice Black decided in Atkinson that the Railway
Labor Act provides for compulsory arbitration "as the exclusive means
of final determination of such 'minor' disputes,"8 2 while section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act does not require compulsory arbitration and
other means of legal redress are provided. On this basis, he dis-
tinguished the two cases. It seems unlikely that Justice Black meant
that the employer could turn to the NLRB for help, since, as already
indicated, there is nothing to show a violation of section 8(b). The
employer's recourse was to sue for damages or request an order to
force arbitration.
In NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Union,83
the Supreme Court had ruled that the NLRB must determine which
of two unions engaged in a jurisdictional dispute is entitled to the
disputed work. Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court, decided
that Congress intended to provide "an effective compulsory method
of getting rid of what were deemed to be the bad consequences of
jurisdictional disputes."8 In a word, Congress had provided for the
compulsory arbitration of jurisdictional disputes. Would Justice Black
permit the issuance of an injunction in a section 301 suit if the con-
tract violation involved jurisdictional warfare forbidden by section
8(b) (4)? If, as the preceding analysis suggests, the distinction be-
tween Chicago River and Atkinson was the determination by Congress
that there must be compulsory mediation under the Railway Labor
Act, he might well do so under Taft-Hartley.
Justice Brennan, on the other hand, felt that Chicago River clearly
expressed the Supreme Court position "that there 'must be an accom-
modation ... so that ... the ... purpose in the enactment of each
[law] is preserved."5 Based on his interpretation of Chicago River,
Justice Brennan felt that an injunction was proper in Atkinson even
though Congress had not spoken clearly concerning the remedies
available under section 301.
It can be argued, with equal vigor, that Congress was uncertain
concerning, or failed to consider adequately, the meaning of section
301.8 Attempting to glean congressional intent, a time-honored
81. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
82. 370 U.S. at 211. (Emphasis added.)
83. 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
84. Id. at 582.
85. 370 U.S. at 217. (Footnote omitted.)




judicial occupation, is often hazardous. It seems that judicial con-
struction might be more sound if judges relied less on ascertaining
congressional intent in doubtful cases and placed greater reliance
upon public need. In many attempts made to determine congres-
sional intent, I am reminded of the currently popular parody entitled
"The Ballad of Oh Boy." My reaction to judicial construction is often,
"oh boy"!
In Chicago River, Lincoln Mills, Warrior, Enterprise, and American
Manufacturing Co., the Supreme Court decided that Congress in-
tended to support public and private arbitration, accommodating the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to the Railway Labor and Taft-Hartley Acts.
In Atkinson, the Supreme Court ignored the arbitration process in
order to protect the right of a union to strike. Congress, according to
the Supreme Court, did not intend to reinstate the use of the injunc-
tion even though a crippling blow was dealt to arbitration. Justice
Black would leave it to Congress to make any necessary changes in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Justice Douglas in Lincoln Mills 7 and
American Manufacturing Co.' used a "quid pro quo" rationale: an
employer agrees to arbitrate in exchange for a union's promise not
to strike. The Supreme Court in these cases discovered a congres-
sional intent to force an employer to abide by his agreement to arbi-
trate, to the benefit of the unions. But the "quid pro quo" is lacking
in Atkinson because the employer cannot force a union to refrain
from striking. In the interest of mutuality and fairness, it seems that
both factions should be forced to live up to their agreements if the
public interest factor is properly weighed. It is unreasonable to
assume that Congress, to force an employer to arbitrate, intended an
accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to section 301, but that
a similar accommodation was not intended if a union ignores an
existing agreement. Such an approach does not maximize industrial
peace. Justice Douglas joined Justice Brennan in his dissent in
Atkinson.
There is irony in the position taken by some of the Justices. Al-
though the majority of Justices agreed with Douglas in Lincoln Mills
and American Manufacturing Co., his "quid pro quo" rationale, evi-
dently, was not taken too seriously; Atkinson points to this conclusion.
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in American Manufacturing
Co., did not accept the "quid pro quo" reasoning advanced by Justice
Douglas. 9 But in Atkinson, Justice Brennan impliedly accepts the
"quid pro quo" thesis by favoring the issuance of an injunction.90
Justice Brennan in Atkinson considered another factor ignored by
87. 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
88. 363 U.S. at 567.
89. Id. at 573.
90. 370 U.S. at 218-19.
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Justice Black. Since federal courts must fashion a body of federal
law to control collective agreements and state courts are obliged to
apply federal law, can a state court issue an injunction when a union
violates its contract?91
In McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council,92 Judge
Traynor of the California Supreme Court decided that a state court
may properly issue an injunction restraining a strike which does not
violate the federal unfair labor practice provisions 3  (It has been
noted that the union conduct in Atkinson probably did not constitute
an unfair labor practice. 4 ) Judge Traynor said:
Thus the purpose behind section 8(d) does not encompass strikes whose aim
is not to bring about a change in contractual relations, such as a strike to
compel an employer to comply with his contract or to protest conduct wholly
ungoverned by the contract. A union may of course bind itself not to
engage in a strike . . .but it is only with strikes used as a weapon in the
bargaining process that Congress has in 8(d) shown sufficient concern to
make them an unfair labor practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board.95
Judge Traynor evidently felt that if an unfair labor practice strike was
in progress, the NLRB would be entitled to exclusive jurisdiction. The
United States Supreme Court in Evening News did not agree.
Judge Traynor examined the federal law regulating collective
agreements and could find nothing in section 301 granting exclusive
jurisdiction to federal courts.96 Favoring concurrent state and federal
court jurisdiction in disputes arising under section 301, he did decide
that state courts must apply the federal law.97 This position was later
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Dowd Box and Lucas
Flour. Discussing the injunction, Judge Traynor took the position
later adopted by Justice Black in Atkinson. Referring to Lincoln Mills
and federal courts, he said that "the Norris-LaGuardia Act was never
intended to prohibit specific enforcement of agreements to arbirtate,
the Supreme Court has not suggested otherwise; strike injunctions
clearly were intended to fall under the ban of the act."9 8 But the
state courts applying federal laws are not bound by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, according to Judge Traynor, and cannot be compelled
to adopt federal remedies. Judge Traynor, in applying a state remedy,
91. Id. at 226-27.
92. 49 Cal. App. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
932 (1958).
93. 315 P.2d at 325-26.
94. See note 67 supra.
95. 315 P.2d at 328.
96. Id. at 329.
97. Id. at 330.
98. Id. at 331.
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did not specifically categorize Norris-LaGuardia as a procedural law;
but neither did he tag the act as substantive law 9 And he could find
nothing which would frustrate the federal law if an injunction was
granted.
Although section 301 was not considered in Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc.,100 the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that a state
court improperly granted an injunction to end conduct constituting an
unfair labor practice. In UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board,'0' the Supreme Court held that state court injunctions were
proper if a tort had been committed. McCarroll was decided on the
basis of a contract, and injunctive aid was permitted by the California
Supreme Court; Judge Traynor, however, carefully pointed out that
an unfair labor practice had not been committed.
On January 21, 1963, the United States Supreme Court once again
considered the propriety of an injunction issued by a state court 02
Although a contract violation was not claimed, the Court nulified a
state court injunction ending union picketing of a nonunion contractor
because there was "at least an arguable violation of section 8(b)
.... ,,103 Even though the picketing may be contrary to a state right-
to-work law, the federal interest is paramount, according to the
Supreme Court.
Justice Brennan in Atkinson believed that Justice Black and McCar-
roll indicated that state law controls the injunction in a state court.
Fearing damage to the uniformity of collective bargaining law, Justice
Brennan said:
So long as state courts remain free to grant the injunctions unavailable in
federal courts, suits seeking relief against concerted activities in breach of
contract will be channeled to the States whenever possible. Ironically, state
rather than federal courts will be the preferred instruments to protect the
integrity of the arbitration process .... 104
Actfually, Justice Black did not discuss whether a state court is free
to apply the state law regulating injunctions in section 301 disputes.
IV. SMiTr v. EvENING NEws Ass'N AND E UNrrED STATEs SUPREME
COURT
Justice White, conceding that the employer violated section 8(a),
was unable to find an exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the NLRB. 105
99. Comment, Injunction in State Court Against Breach of Collective-Bargaining
Agreement, 10 STAx. L. REv. 575, 579-80 (1958).
100. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
101. 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
102. Local 438, Gen. Laborers Union v. Curry, 52 L.R.R.M. 2188 (1962).
103. Id. at 2189.
,104. 370 U.S. at 226.
105. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962).
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As a result, a court is authorized to adjudicate an unfair labor practice
if a contract is breached. Justice White pointedly refused to per-
mit concurrent NLRB and court jurisdiction in all controversies.
Adopting an ad hoc approach, frequently more sensible than trying
to establish a firm rule, Justice White said:
If . . . there are situations in which serious problems will arise from both
the courts and the Board having jurisdiction over acts which amount to an
unfair labor practice, we shall face those cases when they arise. This is not
one of them, in our view, and the National Labor Relations Board is in
accord.106
Submitting an amicus curiae brief in behalf of the NLRB, Solicitor
General Cox took the position "that ousting the courts of jurisdiction
under § 301 in this case would not only fail to promote, but would
actually obstruct, the purposes" of the Taft-Hartley Act.10 7 Why "the
purposes" of the Taft-Hartley Act would not be obstructed in Evening
News was not specifically pinpointed. Since an unfair labor practice
charge was not made within six months, presumably justice would be
obstructed if the plaintiff was denied access to the courts.
It is interesting to speculate why the NLRB chose to have its view-
point made known. Since the NLRB usually decides whether an
unfair labor practice is committed, its policy is known and an amicus
curiae brief is unnecessary. In Evening News, the controversy origi-
nated in a state court so that the NLRB decided to make its opinion
known. But why did the Board favor concurrent NLRB and court
jurisdiction? Was the Board concerned with social justice (because
of the expiration of the six-month period)? Or was the Board in-
terested in reducing its case load by providing another forum?
The thrust of Evening News is inconsequential if read to permit
court adjudication only when the six-month statutory period of limita-
tions prevents access to the NLRB. If Justice White intended to limit
court intervention, and such an interpretation is possible, Evening
News will have little impact on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB. It seems, however, that Justice White favored concurrent
NLRB and court jurisdiction unless "serious problems ... arise ....
If I interpret Justice White's opinion correctly, Evening News will
reduce the number of unfair labor practice charges heard by the
NLRB and forum-shopping will mount. An important reason for
creating the NLRB was to minimize judicial intervention and permit
experts to deal with labor problems.108 In addition section 301, which
106. Id. at 197-98. (Footnote omitted.)
107. 371 U.S. at 198 n.6.
108. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Part II, 1st Sess. 13 (1947) (Senator Thomas);
S. REP'. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935).
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promotes arbitration, is also designed to minimize court intervention.
Justice White in Evening News obviously decided that courts are
equally competent to deal with labor problems and ignored the risk
of conflicting opinion (unless of "serious problems") and other pro-
cedural problems.
In Atkinson, justice Brennan expressed the opinion that many con-
troversies would be channeled into state courts where the Norris-
LaGuardia Act is not applicable.1 9 One means of limiting the exodus
of section 301 controversies to state courts is to restrict the jurisdiction
of all courts in conflicts satisfactorily resolved by the NLRB. Yet, in
Evening News Justice Brennan agreed with the majority of justices
and favored concurrent NLRB and court jurisdiction. Justice White
in Evening News could find nothing in the Taft-Hartley Act which
gave the NLRB an exclusive grant of jurisdiction. Although section
301 is free of any jurisdictional limitations, Justice White could have
prevented court adjudication by turning to section 10(c). 110 Section
10(c) empowers the NLRB to make all unfair labor practice deci-
sions, and an inference can be made that section 301 should not be
used to dodge Board jurisdiction. In addition, section 303(b) permits
suits for damages when the union violates section 8(b) (4).111 Can
this be taken as an indication that the only unfair labor practice suits
in which Congress wished to permit court intervention were those
covered in section 8 (b) (4) ?
It is possible for state and federal courts to award damages via
section 301, while the NLRB, adjudicating the same controversy,
might deny an infraction of section 8(b). Furthermore, courts and
the NLRB often quarrel over the proper penalty even if they agree
that an unfair labor practice is committed; some courts and geo-
graphic areas are more "hostile" to labor than other courts and the
NLRB. Would exclusive NLRB jurisdiction serve the public better
than regulation in different camps?
A collective agreement binds only the signatories, while section 8
applies to all employers and unions. Many agreements provide for the
arbitration of disputes involving unfair labor practices. This leads to
a conflict between the expressed national policy of promoting collec-
tive bargaining and arbitration with NLRB decision-making. Should
one method of handling disputes be favored over the other?
In some situations, the NLRB refuses to adjudicate unfair labor
practice charges which are contractually arbitrable.ln If unions and/
109. Notes 91 & 104 supra.
110. 61 Stat. 147 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). (1958).
Ill. 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958).
112. Consolidated Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944); Spielberg
Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930,
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or employers refuse to arbitrate, courts can force them to abide by
their agreements. 113 If the contract does not provide for arbitration,
courts and the NLRB can deal with unfair labor practices blanketed
by an agreement. Where the unfair labor practice conduct is neither
contractually controlled nor arbitrable, the aggrieved party can turn
only to the NLRB for help. The NLRB, if an unfair labor practice
charge is brought, is concerned only with whether section 8 is violated
-it is not, for example, concerned with contract interpretation or the
reasonableness of the action taken by an employer or union. An
arbitrator, on the other hand, will look to the contract and determine
if the penalty imposed on an employee is reasonable." 4
Because of self-imposed monetary yardsticks, the NLRB refuses to
hear unfair labor practice charges considered monetarily unim-
portant."5 If a collective agreement provides for arbitration or the
dispute is specifically controlled by contract, the NLRB monetary
exclusion has little public impact. If the unfair labor practice is
neither contractually controlled nor subject to NLRB jurisdiction, the
aggrieved person cannot resort to any of the three forums discussed.
In such a situation the public interest must be considered.
Desiring to avoid duplication and differences in laws, Justice Black,
dissenting in Evening News, felt that courts should not be permitted
to deal with unfair labor practices. 116 If the NLRB adequately deals
with unfair labor practices, this position is well-founded. Solicitor
General Cox's reason for favoring court intervention in Evening News
may be valid, but this does not mean that another forum should be
opened to hear unfair labor practice charges. Employers prefer
judicial intervention and distrust arbitrators simply because arbitration
tends to favor unions and employees. Much of the labor litigation
since Lincoln Mills concerns an employer's refusal to arbitrate." 7
(1954); Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951). I do not intend to imply
that the NLRB has followed a "hands-off" approach in all cases.
113. See note 45 supra.
114. Kovarsky, Discharges for Events Occurring Away From Work, 13 LAD. L.J.
374 (1962).
115. CCH LABOR LAw COURSE 1963 at 1549-53 (13th ed. 1963).
116. 371 U.S. at 202. Justice Black stated: "One example is enough to show how
Congress' policy of confining controversies over unfair labor practices to the Labor
Board might well be frustrated by permitting unfair labor practice claimants to choose
whether they will seek relief in the courts or before the Board. Section 10(b) of the
Act provides that 'no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice
occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board ....'
In contrast, the statute of limitations in Michigan covering contract suits like this is six
years. The Court's holding thus opens up a way to defeat the congressional plan,
adopted over vigorous minority objection, to expedite industrial peace .... Instead, by
permitting suits like this .. .it is . .. highly probable that unfair labor practice
disputes will hang on like festering sores .... " Id. at 202-03. (Footnotes omitted.)
117. Kovarsky, Comment: The Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate, 14 VAND.
L. R v. 1105 (1961).
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Many may also prefer court adjudication to NLRB processing, and
Evening News permits employers to by-pass the NLRB under the thin
disguise of contract enforcement. The three 1960 Supreme Court
decisions favoring arbitration "8 spurred employers to the greater
detailing of collective bargaining agreements, and Evening News
provides additional incentive for contract enlargement as a means of
circumventing NLRB control. A union, it is said, agrees not to strike
in exchange for an employer's agreement to arbitrate disputes. Having
more confidence in an arbitrator, whom they help select, than a judge,
unions negotiating collective bargaining agreements seek to make as
many disputes arbitrable as contractually possible. If the dispute is
not arbitrable, union leaders seem to prefer NLRB adjudication to
court intervention. In summation, unions prefer arbitration, NLRB
adjudication, and court intervention in that order. Employers on the
other hand seem to prefer judicial construction over NLRB adjudica-
tion and arbitration.
Although employers express a preference for the courts, section 303,
curiously, is infrequently resorted to; employers seldom seek damages
from unions responsible for violating section 8(b) (4). This may
indicate that employers will use section 301 sparingly, even where
unions violate the unfair labor practice provisions, because the em-
ployer is more interested in injunctive relief than damages. Atkinson
prohibits an injunction in a federal court to halt a strike; unless the
same prohibition applies to state courts, the position taken in Evening
News signals a wholesale migration to state courts. Section 10(j)
authorizes the NLRB to request an injunction when "any person has
engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice .. ."119 Under
section 10(1), the NLRB is required to request an injunction when it
is suspected that section 8(b) (4) and 8(e) are disregarded.u 9 But
because of the Norris-LaGuardia Act employers are not permitted to
secure injunctions. If a state court is permitted to issue an injunction,
then section 301 may be used as a procedural device to get around
the Norris-LaGuardia ban. In McCarroll, Judge Traynor decided
that the strike was not an unfair labor practice, so that a state court
could properly issue an injunction. The propriety of issuing an in-
junction in a state court to stop a contractual unfair labor practice
will have to be considered by the Supreme Court.
In the case of In re Green,121 the Supreme Court ruled in a habeas
118. Steelworkers Union v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers Union
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
119. 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1958).
120. 61 Stat. 149 (1947) (amended 73 Stat. 544 (1959), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1601(1) (Supp. III, 1962).
121. 369 U.S. 689 (1962).
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corpus proceeding that a state court erroneously held an attorney in
contempt for instructing members of a union that a state court cannot
issue an injunction while an unfair labor practice charge is processed.
Justice Douglas, writing the opinion, stated that "When an activity
is 'arguably' subject to the National Board the States must defer to
its 'exclusive competence,' 'if the danger of state interference with
national policy is to be averted."' On the basis of a contract,
Evening News permits court intervention. Justice Harlan, concurring
in Green, believed that state courts, under Dowd Box and Lucas Flour,
can adjudicate section 301 controversies even if "arguably" subject
"to sections 7 or 8 of the National Labor Relations Act" and that
Garmon does not control.m He also indicated that a state court
properly invokes injunctive procedure when a union violates a collec-
tive agreement by striking.
Where an employer and union agree to arbitrate an unfair labor
practice, three forums may be open. According to Lincoln Mills and
the three 1960 Steelworkers cases, a union or employer can be forced
to abide by an agreement to arbitrate. Although Justice White in
Evening News limited his decision to whether a court properly awards
damages where section 8 controls, it seems, by analogy, that nothing
in the Taft-Hartley Act prevents an arbitrator from making an award.
Unless there is a valid reason to deny jurisdiction, Evening News
permits such a conclusion. Judge Magruder, considering a similar
problem in United Electrical Workers v. Worthington Corp., decided:
[T]he arbitrators in the present controversy had jurisdiction over the allega-
tion that the discharges were not for just cause under the contract, even
though it be assumed . . . that the Union was also presenting an allegation
of refusal to bargain before imposing a new condition of employment, which
latter assertion may be a matter for exclusive cognizance by the NLRB.
The majority decision of the arbitrators in fact passed only upon the wrong-
ful discharge aspect of the case and turned aside the refusal to bargain
aspect . .124
As already indicated, employees and unions favor arbitration over
NLRB and court adjudication whereas employers prefer judicial de-
termination, particularly if the injunction is available. Depending
on which side seeks to enforce the agreement, arbitration or court
adjudication will be preferred, and the NLRB will in either instance
be relegated to second slot. Is this the result Congress intended when
enacting the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts? Disregarding congres-
sional intent, is the by-passing of the NLRB desirable? When enacting
the federal law, Congress, intending to place courts in a back seat,
122. Id. at 693.
123. Id. at 694.
124. 236 F.2d 364, 370 (1st Cir. 1956). See discussion in note 46 supra.
[VOL. 16
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
promoted arbitration and NLRB determination. Unions, if my
analysis is correct, will tend to follow the congressional mandate and
seek arbitration or prefer unfair labor practice charges while em-
ployers, because of Evening News, will rely on the courts. If it is de-
cided that state courts can issue injunctions against unions who violate
an agreement and section 8(b), then employers will avoid the federal
courts as well as the NLRB.
The employer's second defense in Evening News was lifted from
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.-5 Here a union, in behalf of its members, sued an
employer who failed to compensate employees according to their
agreement. Section 301(a) permits "Suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization . . . or between such
organizations . . . ." Justice Frankfurter decided that section 301
only gave "procedural directions to the federal courts"- 6 and that
"To turn § 301 into an agency for working out a viable theory of the
nature of a collective bargaining agreement smacks of unreality. Nor
does it seem reasonable to view that section as a delivery into the
discretionary hands of the federal judiciary, finally of this Court,
of such an important . .. field. . ... 27 Recognizing the conflicting
problem raised-union control versus the presentation of individual
grievances"28-Justice Frankfurter concluded:
Considering the nature of a collective bargaining contract, which involves
the correlative rights of employer, employee and union, we might be dis-
posed to read § 301 as allowing the union to sue in this case. With due
regard to the constitutional difficulties which would be raised, and in view
of the fact that such an interpretation would bring to the federal courts an
extensive range of litigation heretofore entertained by the States, we con-
clude that Congress did not will this result. There was no suggestion that
Congress, at a time when its attention was directed to congestion in the
federal courts . . . intended to open the doors of the federal courts to a
potential flood of grievances based upon an employer's failure to comply
with terms of a collective agreement relating to compensation, terms peculiar
in the individual benefit which is their subject matter and which, when
violated, give a cause of action to the individual employee. The employees
have always been able to enforce their individual rights in the state
courts .... m
Justice Douglas dissented in Westinghouse because:
125. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
126. Id. at 443. This was later reversed in Lincoln Mills by Justice Douglas who
declared that § 301 created substantive rights.
127. Id. at 456. This was also reversed by Lincoln Mills in which power was
granted to the federal judges to fix a body of contract law governing collective
agreements.
128. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
129. 348 U.S. at 459-60. (Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.)
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We make mountains out of molehills in not allowing the union to be the
suing as well as the bargaining agency for its members as respects matters
involving the construction and enforcement of the collective bargaining
agreement. Individual contracts of employment result from each collective
bargaining agreement . . . . The concept of collective bargaining . . .
includes . . . the negotiation of the collective agreement and the settling
of the terms of the individual contracts . ... 130
Although a distinction can be made between Westinghouse and
Evening News in that a union brought suit in the former while an
individual employee and assignee claimed redress in the latter con-
troversy, the Court decided to overrule Westinghouse. Agreeing with
Justice Douglas's dissent in Westinghouse, Justice White said in
Evening News:
The concept that all suits to vindicate individual employee rights arising
from a collective bargaining contract should be excluded from the coverage
of § 301 has thus not survived. [Westinghouse has been overruled.] The
rights of individual employees . . . are a major focus of the negotiation
and administration of collective bargaining contracts. Individual claims lie
at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, and are to a large
degree inevitably intertwined with union interests .... 131
He reasoned that Lincoln Mills, Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
Dowd Box, Atkinson, and General Electric Co. v. Local 205, United
Electrical Workerslm reversed Westinghouse. Lincoln Mills, the legal
millennium, came after Westinghouse, and it decided that section 301
created a substantive as well as a procedural right. In Lincoln
Mills,133 General Electric Co.,1' Enterprise,m and Lucas Flour'36
the unions sought to force employers to abide by contracts calling for
arbitration. Although the grievances were pressed by individual union
members and the unions had petitioned the courts to force the em-
ployers to arbitrate, the Supreme Court did not question the propriety
of the suits. In Atkinson,'37 the employer sued the union which failed
to abide by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and the
question of individual rights was not an issue (although individual
grievances led to the dispute),
The employer in Evening News claimed that section 301 restricts
suit to unions and employers38 so that state contract law controls em-
130. Id. at 465-66.
131. 371 U.S. at 200.
132. 353 U.S. 547 (1957). This is a companion case to Lincoln Mills.
133. 353 U.S. at 449.
134. Id. at 547-48.
135. 363 U.S. at 595.
136. 369 U.S. at 97.
137. 370 U.S. at 197-98.
138. 371 U.S. at 198.
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ployee actions. According to this view, employees cannot invoke sec-
tion 301 to sue an employer. Justice White decided that Congress did
not limit the use of section 301 to employer and union because it
would have different meanings under state and federal law and would
negatively influence the negotiation and administration of collective
agreements. 1 He carefully pointed out that section 301 permits suits
by employees; however, whether the plaintiff's action was properly
initiated under the no-discrimination clause was not decided. 40 Justice
Black, dissenting, argued that the majority
refrains from saying when, for what kinds of breach, or under what cir-
cumstances an individual employee can bring a § 301 action and when he
must step aside for the union to prosecute his claim. Nor does the Court
decide whether the suit brought in this case is one of the types which an
individual can bring . . . . This Court usually refrains from deciding
important questions . . . without first satisfying itself that the party raising
those questions is entitled ... to prosecute the case .... 141
Justice Black expressed further dissatisfaction with the majority opin-
ion because it was not decided "whether an employee injured by
discrimination of either his employer or union can file and prosecute
his own lawsuit in his own way."1
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is on a concurrent jurisdiction "bender," per-
mitting state and federal courts to adjudicate unfair labor practices
if the activities are covered by a contract. The position Justice White
took in Evening News is questionable because section 10 authorizes
the NLRB to decide disagreements blanketed by section 8(a) or (b).
By permitting suits, judges are making unfair labor practice decisions
even if another jurisdictional label is applied.
Dowd Box and Lucas Flour permit state courts to pass on questions
of contract violation, providing federal law governs. Evening News
permits a state or federal court to deal with an unfair labor practice
under section 301. Lincoln Mills, I believe, stands for the proposition
that federal judges establish the federal law necessary to breath life
into section 301.143 But what happens to uniform regulation?
Based on the particular facts in Evening News, the decision may be
fair because the six-month unfair labor practice charge period had
139. Id. at 200-01.
140. Id. at 200-01 & n.9.
141. Id. at 204.
142. Id. at 204-05.
143. 353 U.S. at 451. Justice Douglas states "that it [§ 301] authorizes federal
courts to fashion a body of federal law .... " Ibid.
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expired. But is it desirable to open the door wide and permit courts
to deal with unfair labor practices regulated by contract? Justice
White did not clearly indicate the reach of Evening News so that its
future impact is easily limited; it is difficult to forecast with conviction
compelling judicial reasons for refusing to entertain an unfair labor
practice suit.
Justice White left another opening for judicial entanglement. He
did not hold in Evening News that the employee properly brought
suit under the no-discrimination clause-he only decided that em-
ployees can use section 301 to press claims. Many court decisions
will be necessary before the type of contractual violation subject to
employee prosecution is established. Moreover, further judicial ampli-
fication will be necessary to determine the circumstances in which a
union or employer may properly invoke section 301 in conflicts regu-
lated by section 8. In Evening News the complainant was an em-
ployee. Does an employer or union, certainly more knowledgeable
than an employee, properly bring suit under section 301 when the
six-month statute of limitation has expired, or should laches be in-
voked? The possibility of laches may explain why the suit was
brought by an employee rather than the union; since the employee
was also the assignee of other employees' claims, it is possible that
the union was behind the suit. Did counsel feel that the courts would
be more receptive to an action initiated by an employee rather than
the union because of the expiration of the six-month period? Is the
decision in Evening News limited to employee suits? Are the reasons
compelling to limit the use of section 301 to an employee? The Court
in Evening News uses section 301 to protect individual employees.
Lincoln Mills delegates to federal judges the task of fixing rules to
govern employer-union agreements. The judicial inventiveness which
Justice Douglas called for in Lincoln Mills faces additional strain now
that individual employees are permitted access to court, especially
where there is an unfair labor practice. The ground rules established
by courts to guide unions and employers are not necessarily con-
trolling nor equitable for employees; added judicial "legislation" will
be necessary to establish "markers."
Although state courts have turned to state law to determine in-
dividual rights under a collective agreement,'4 Dowd Box and Lucas
Flour call for the application of federal law. When has federal law
been established and when does it apply? Does Lincoln Mills pre-
clude state judges from declaring federal law? State courts can
unquestionably adjudicate section 301 controversies once federal law
is established. My understanding of Lincoln Mills indicates that fed-
144. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 -ALv. L. REv. 601 (1956); Hans-
lowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959).
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eral judges must choose the law which will control employers operat-
ing in interstate commerce. Since Evening News establishes, probably
for the first time, that an individual has a right to rely on section 301
where an unfair labor practice occurs, has Justice White implemented
or reversed Lincoln Mills by letting a state court consider a dispute
never before adjudicated by a federal court? If the controversy opens
in a state court and later reaches the United States Supreme Court, a
federal judge fixes the federal law as required in Lincoln Mills. But
this approach fails to come to grips with the problem because few
cases reach the Supreme Court, and a state court, in the first instance,
is permitted to decide the federal law. Does Evening News permit
a state court to declare the federal law?
Employers suing unions for damages under section 303 of the Taft-
Hartley Act, an action which does not require contractual violation,
must proceed in a federal district court. Suits under section 301, on
the other hand, require a union-management agreement. If a union
breaks its contract and violates section 8(b) (4), can a state court
consider the controversy under section 301? Sections 301 and 303 are
distinctive rights and apparently the state courts, under Dowd Box,
can make a decision. On the other hand, a suit hinging on section
303 must originate in a federal court.
Granting individuals (or unions and employers) access to state
and federal courts in addition to permitting NLRB adjudication shat-
ters uniform regulation. Where a union or employer commits an un-
fair labor practice, the exclusive use of the NLRB maximizes the
possibility of uniform control. The extent to which NLRB and state
and federal court regulation hinders uniformity remains to be seen.
An additional factor stemming from Evening News is the union in-
terest when an individual member proceeds under section 301. To
some extent, the ability of the union to control the enforcement of the
agreement and the rank-and-file is curtailed by permitting individual
suits. Furthermore, the number of suits brought to state and federal
courts concerning contract violations will increase simply because
both a union and its members can sue. 145 From a democratic view-
point, permitting individuals to sue is appealing, but other factors,
such as union control over members and the increasing number of
suits, must be considered. In the absence of circumstances indicating
a need for individual redress, restricting the right to sue to the union
representative may be desirable.46 Now, Evening News is thrown
145. Jenkins v. Win. Schluderberg-TJ. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88
(1958).
146. See Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rmv. 362 (1962). Professor Summers maintains that members should be
permitted to sue and states: "The question is not the unions' status as exclusive rep-
resentative in making the collective agreement, nor the union's freedom in negotiating
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back to the state court to determine if an employee can sue under a
no-discrimination clause. The courts may then decide that the
union rather than the individual is a proper party to sue. In Evening
News, the plaintiff was an assignee of the claims of 49 other em-
ployees; it seems unlikely under this circumstance that the courts will
be burdened if the individual rather than the union brings suit.
Few cases have been brought to court by individual members.' 4
Westinghouse was reversed for sound reasons-it is confusing to
distinguish between a union's rights and those of particular interest
to its members.14 The majority of the Court in Westinghouse as-
sumed that the employees would have to sue their employer in a state
court. Starting with Lincoln Mills and culminating with Dowd Box
and Lucas Flour, the Supreme Court firmly established the rule that
state and federal courts are authorized to hear controversies under
section 301 brought by unions and employers, while emphasizing that
federal law controls. Evening News permits union members to enter
the melting pot, at least to some extent.
Evening News presents another issue requiring further determina-
tion. If a court considers an unfair labor practice violation under
section 301, does the law developed by the NLRB control? Or
must the courts develop a body of substantive law a la Lincoln
Mills? Since the NLRB has enunciated a vast body of administrative
law, much of which has been approved by the courts of appeals and
the Supreme Court, it may be wasteful to permit judges to make
unfair labor practice decisions under section 301. Section 301 regu-
lates contractual undertakings so that principles of contract law con-
trol. Contractual arrangements and unfair labor practice charges
brought before the NLRB do not necessarily present the same prob-
lem. In a dispute brought under section 301, the court is required
to examine the agreement in order to decide whether the plaintiff's
suit is well-founded. In a section 8 charge, the NLRB is only con-
cerned with the Taft-Hartley Act and does not consider the agree-
ment. It seems that NLRB and subsequent court of appeals decisions
would not be controlling in a section 301 suit brought before a
federal district judge or in a state court. Following the Supreme
Court view expressed in Lincoln Mills, the courts in section 301 con-
troversies can look to NLRB and other decisions and take the course
of action deemed most suitable; but the trial judges will decide which
the substantive terms of the collective agreement to make them binding on all em-
ployees in the unit. On the contrary, the individual insists that his terms and con-
ditions shall be governed by the substantive provisions of the agreement. He does not
appeal for a variance from those provisions, but rather demands compliance with
them ...." Id. at 370.
147. Id. at 375.
148. Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-Hartley
Section 301, 66 YALE L.J. 167 (1956).
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rule shall be applied. This added burden of establishing additional
rules of law could have been avoided had the Supreme Court ruled
in favor of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction.
Although the Supreme Court in Evening News allowed suit for
damages for unfair labor practice activity, whether an arbitrator can
make an award under such circumstances was not considered. Using
the rationale of Justice White, it seems that arbitrators can also decide
unfair labor practice questions since there is nothing in the federal
law which prevents it.
On March 11, 1963 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a dis-
pute involving arbitrability, decided that "The Supreme Court has all
but sounded the death-knell of the theory of exclusive NLRB jurisdic-
tion in cases arising under section 301 . . .," and referred to Eve-
ning News.149 The court did not feel that the conflict between
NLRB decision-reaching and arbitration presents a pressing problem
even though "the mere rendition of an arbitration award in no way
precludes the Board from exercising jurisdiction . . . ,"15 I would
disagree with the court because of other factors already reviewed;
concurrent jurisdiction maximizes the possibility of conflict. If the
NLRB adjudicates a dispute which was submitted to arbitration, then
it can also make a decision in a dispute already decided by a state
or federal court. And so goes our need for uniform regulation. Oh
boy!
149. Carey v. General Elec. Co., 52 L.R.R.M. 2663, 2669 (1963).
150. Id. at 2670.
1963]

